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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lemon v. Kurtzman sits at the center of one of the most controversial
and complex areas of constitutional law—the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.1 The case also may be the most maligned case in all
First Amendment jurisprudence.2 Jurists and academics from across the
ideological spectrum have attacked Lemon and its infamous test to no end.3
Some have even posited that the 2019 American Legion v. American
Humanist Association decision rang the death knell for the Lemon test.4
And yet, the Lemon test persists. Despite numerous calls for Lemon’s
demise, the case has never been expressly overruled in its entirety.5
Therefore, the case remains within the available analytical framework for
judicial resolution of most Establishment Clause cases. Indeed, even after
American Legion, most district and circuit courts have used Lemon to analyze
Establishment Clause issues, aside from those involving religiously
expressive public monuments, displays, symbols, mottos, and ceremonies.6
The objective of this Article is not to serve as a standard-bearer or
an apologia for Lemon. Instead, it works from a baseline that the Lemon test
is not perfect and is not the best test for all Establishment Clause cases.
Rather, this Article is designed to explain the mechanisms of why Lemon has
1
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in “doctrinal bankruptcy”);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (deeming the Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine “neither principled nor unified”).
2
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Steven K. Green, The “Irrelevance”
of Church-State Separation in the Twenty-First Century, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 54 (2019) (noting the
negative status of Lemon among some jurists); Claudia E. Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821,
828 n.37 (2014) (discussing the extensive judicial criticism of the Lemon test).
3
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (bemoaning the “strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and
wavering shapes [Lemon’s] intermittent use has produced”).
4
See, e.g., Roger Byron, Lemon is Dead, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y: FEDSOC BLOG (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/lemon-is-dead (“Whatever else may be said, American Legion
tolls the end of the Lemon era. Its sun has set. Its reign is over.”).
5
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that the failure of the Court to overrule Lemon in its entirety was an error).
6
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081 n.16 (Alito, J., plurality opinion).
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persisted and will likely continue to persist as a tool, among several
interpretive approaches, for the examination of claimed First Amendment
violations in the realm of education law.7
To do so, this Article will explore the Lemon case, its legacy or
aftermath (depending on one’s perspective), its continued persistence, and its
likely endurance into the future. This Article will start by briefly outlining
the Establishment Clause and the complex jurisprudence that has followed its
interpretation, specifically in the area of education law. From there,
this Article will take a close look at Lemon and examine its legacy by
contrasting education law cases that followed its framework as precedent with
other cases that criticized the Lemon test. Then, this Article will analyze the
extent of American Legion’s impact on Establishment Clause analysis in
the lower federal courts, which will demonstrate that these courts continue to
use the Lemon test in education law cases.
Next, this Article will consider why Lemon has continued to persist
in education law Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Supreme Court
made its decision fifty years ago. This part will discuss how the lack of
a formal overruling of the case has resulted in Lemon continuing to be a valid
analytical method for lower courts to employ in Establishment Clause
decision-making. This part will subsequently argue that lower courts’
continued usage of the Lemon test is not an error; it is, instead, a mere
alignment with the hierarchical precedent doctrine. Next, it will explore
the reasons why the Supreme Court has yet to expressly overrule Lemon in
its entirety and why the Court has continued to use Lemon in some of its
education law cases.
Finally, the Article will argue that Lemon’s enduring persistence also
signals: (1) the likelihood of its continued use by lower courts in the future;
and (2) its continued preservation in some form by the Court. Until it is
expressly overruled, Lemon provides lower courts with an articulable
constitutional guideline to support their decisions—the application of which
reinforces judicial authority to some degree and provides a better alternative
to judicial fiat. And it seems unlikely that a majority of the Court will reach
a consensus to expressly overrule Lemon in its entirety, given that it could
destabilize an area of First Amendment jurisprudence that is of critical
importance in our democracy. Essentially, taking this action of finality with
the Lemon test might prove to be the ultimate cautionary tale of “be careful
what you wish for.” Therefore, this Article will conclude that, despite the
rampant criticism, there is a valid method to the madness for why Lemon has
continued to endure for fifty years and why it will likely continue to persist,
at least for education law Establishment Clause cases, in the future.
7
Unless stated otherwise, the references in this Article to education law or school law apply
specifically to the K–12 school environment.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE & LEMON V. KURTZMAN

A. An Overview of the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”8 This religion
clause applies to all official federal, state, and local governmental
action, given its incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as articulated by the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision of
Everson v. Board of Education.9 There are at least seven broad categories of
Establishment Clause cases, which include:
(1) religious references or imagery in public monuments,
symbols, mottos, displays, and ceremonies; (2) religious
accommodations and exemptions from generally applicable
laws; (3) subsidies and tax exemptions; (4) religious
expression in public schools; (5) regulation of private
religious speech; . . . (6) state interference with internal
church affairs; [and (7)] [a] final, miscellaneous category,
including cases involving such issues as Sunday closing
laws, and church involvement in governmental
decisionmaking . . . .10
Due to the sparsity of the language within the clause and the variety of
Establishment Clause cases that arise, there is not one ready-made test that
the Supreme Court applies in its establishment jurisprudence.11
This divergent decision-making extends to the Court’s analysis of
Establishment Clause educational law cases. Rather than employing a unitary
approach, the Court has used a variety of analytical frameworks here.12
Prior to Lemon, these included a purpose and primary effect test, neutrality
8

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (noting the Establishment Clause’s application
to “legislation or official conduct to determine whether . . . it establishes a religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so.”); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of
the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 507 (2006) (outlining the various federal, state, and local
government actions that give rise to claims of Establishment Clause violations); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
10
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081 n.16 (Alito, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
11
See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (“The prohibition
on establishment covers a variety of issues from prayer in widely varying government settings, to financial
aid for religious individuals and institutions, to comment on religious questions.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining the necessity of different analytical
approaches for different types of Establishment Clause cases); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. C.L. Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (rejecting the notion that Establishment Clause
doctrine can be encapsulated into “a single verbal formulation”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (noting that the
Establishment Clause “is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application”).
12
See Khaled A. Beydoun, Bisecting American Islam? Divide, Conquer, and CounterRadicalization, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 487–490 (2018) (outlining the range of tests used in interpreting the
Establishment Clause).
9
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analyses, a coercion analysis, and a historical approach.13 The absence of
a singular test in this area of law has resulted in a difficult-to-decipher opacity
that, at a first (or second or third) glance, seems to drill down to consistent
inconsistency. For the Court, the defining feature of its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in the area of education law has been “line-drawing [in order to]
determin[e] at what point a dissenter’s rights of religious freedom are
infringed by the State,” no matter the analytical framework it has applied.14
In Lemon, however, the Court bluntly admitted it “can only dimly perceive
the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law.”15
B. An Extended Examination of Lemon v. Kurtzman
A close look at the Lemon decision is warranted in any critical
examination of this case. At issue in Lemon were two state statutes in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania that provided state financial aid to church-related
K-12 schools.16 Both were challenged under the First Amendment Religion
Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.17
The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act enacted in 1969 pertained
to teachers at nonpublic elementary schools; these schools served about onequarter of the state’s students.18 Of these students, approximately 95%
attended Roman Catholic church-affiliated schools.19 The statute authorized
state officials to pay nonpublic elementary school teachers of secular subjects
a supplement of up to 15% of their annual salary.20 The Act was enacted
based on the state legislature’s “finding that the quality of education available
in nonpublic elementary schools [had] been jeopardized by the rapidly rising
salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers.”21 A condition
for eligibility for the salary supplement was an attestation in writing that the
teacher would not teach any religion courses while receiving a supplement.22
All of the 250 teachers who applied for the salary supplement taught at Roman
Catholic nonpublic schools.23

13
See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (stating that
governmental action violates the Establishment Clause “[i]f either [the purpose or the primary effect of the
government action] is the advancement or inhibition of religion”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425,
430–31 (1962) (applying a neutrality approach, emphasizing the coercive pressure of governmentsupported religious conformity, and finding an Establishment Clause violation for school prayer based
on the colonial history of seeking religious freedom in America).
14
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
15
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
16
See id. at 606.
17
See id.
18
See id. at 607–08.
19
See id.
20
See id. at 607.
21
Id.
22
See id. at 608.
23
Id.
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Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1968 based on a legislative finding that state
financial support of nonpublic schools’ delivery of “purely secular
educational objectives” would fulfill the educational goals of the state.24
Under this statute, the state would “directly reimburse[] nonpublic schools
solely for their actual expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials” that were part of the schools’ “secular educational
service[s].”25 Pursuant to the law, Pennsylvania entered into reimbursement
contracts with 1,181 nonpublic K-12 schools that served over one-fifth of the
state’s student body.26 Of these students, more than 96% were pupils of
church-related schools—most of which were “affiliated with the Roman
Catholic church.”27
In evaluating the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court candidly
acknowledged the intricacy of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.28
It then analyzed the text of the Establishment Clause, emphasizing that this
text “did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state
religion, an area history shows [the Clause’s authors] regarded as very
important and fraught with great dangers.”29 Instead, the text extends to laws
respecting establishment, “in the sense of being a step that could lead to such
establishment . . . .”30
Given that the text of the Establishment Clause does not provide
a precise test, the Court determined the starting point of its analysis was the
“consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years.”31 Based on this precedent, the Court gleaned “[t]hree such tests”—
the sum articulation of which henceforth has been deemed the Lemon test:
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
with religion.’”32
In applying this framework to the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes, the Court determined that both statutes had secular legislative
purposes under the first prong because the legislatures clearly stated their
intent was “to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools
covered by the compulsory attendance laws.”33 The Court gave deference to
24

Id. at 609
Id. at 609–10.
26
Id. at 610.
27
Id.
28
See id. at 612.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citing Bd. of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
33
Id. at 613.
25
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this legislative intent, as it found there was no indication of an undermining
sham legislative purpose.34
As to the second prong, the Court declined to decide whether each
statute’s “principal or primary effect [was] one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.”35 However, the Court signaled that such an inquiry would
be a very close one given the states’ recognition of the significant religious
missions of church-related schools, the substantiality of the schools’
religion-oriented activities, and the statutory restrictions to ensure
government financial support was exclusive to the schools’ secular, rather
than religious, educational services.36 Consequently, the Court concluded that
“[a]ll these provisions are precautions taken in candid recognition that these
programs approached, even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas
under the Religion Clauses.”37
The Court did not resolve this principal or primary effect question
because it “conclude[d] that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement
between government and religion.”38 In defining the objective of this
entanglement prong, the Court determined that it was “to prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either [state or religion] into the precincts of the
other” while recognizing that “total separation between church and state . . .
is not possible in an absolute sense.” 39 Consequently, the Court rejected the
Jeffersonian notion of complete separation of church and state as part of its
entanglement analysis.40 Instead, the Court asserted that “[j]udicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from
being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship.”41 Thus, “to determine whether
the government entanglement with religion is excessive,” the Court would
“examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between
the government and the religious authority.”42
1. The Entanglement Analysis for the Rhode Island Statute
This entanglement examination led the Court to find that the Rhode
Island statute was an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause.43
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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In analyzing the characters and purposes of the institutions that were benefited
by the Rhode Island statute, the Court first outlined the district court’s factual
findings that the sole beneficiaries of the statute—Roman Catholic
elementary schools—were located in close proximity to parish churches in
order to allow “convenient access for religious exercises since instruction
in faith and morals is part of the total educational process”; were adorned with
overtly religious symbols that included crosses, crucifixes, religious
paintings, and religious statues; and featured teaching faculties primarily
composed of “nuns of various religious orders.”44 These findings by the
district court led to its conclusion that the parochial schools were integral to
the Catholic Church’s religious mission, were powerfully effective at
inculcating the church’s religious doctrine, and “involve[d] substantial
religious activity and purpose.”45
Based on those findings, the Supreme Court determined that
“[t]he substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives rise
to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses
sought to avoid.”46 This finding mirrored the legislature’s concerns that
resulted in strict controls within the statutory scheme to ensure that secular
education was the only recipient of state financial support.47
The Court proceeded to differentiate the target of this statute’s
financial support from its past precedent that upheld the provision of state
financial aid to church-related schools for “secular, neutral, or nonideological
services, facilities, or materials.”48
In the present case, unlike
“[b]us transportation, school lunches, public health services, and secular
textbooks supplied in common to all students,” the statutory supplement was
directed toward teachers.49 Whereas the secularity of a textbook was
discernable, “a teacher’s handling of a subject is not.”50 Subsequently, the
Court highlighted the danger “that a teacher under religious control and
discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular
aspects of precollege education.”51
Applying this premise to the record, the Court determined
“these dangers [were] present to a substantial degree.”52 The lay teachers,
most of whom practiced the Catholic faith, were “employed by a religious
organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities,

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 616–17.
See id.
Id. at 607, 617.
Id. at 617.
Id.
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and work[ed] in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith.”53
Of all the relevant Roman Catholic schools’ principals, all but two were nuns
appointed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence’s appointed
representative or the “Mother Provincial of the order whose members staff
the school.”54 Lay teachers were interviewed by that appointed representative
and the principal; the parish priest for the school negotiated the
teachers’ salaries and signed their contracts.55 The church schools’ handbook
“advise[d] teachers to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary
work” in furtherance of their mission and noted that “[r]eligious formation
[was] not confined to formal [religious] courses.”56 Consequently, the Court
determined that “[r]eligious authority necessarily pervade[d] the school
system.”57
The Court explicitly stated that it did not impart bad faith or an intent
to evade the Constitution’s limits on these teachers in finding impermissible
government entanglement with religion here.58 Instead, the Court
recognize[d] that a dedicated religious person, teaching in
a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to
inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty
in remaining religiously neutral. . . . With the best of
intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total
separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine.59
Consequently, the “potential for impermissible fostering of religion” was
inherently present in this educational environment.60
Given that reasonable potentiality, in order to ensure that state
“subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion,” as that would transverse the
limits of the Religion Clauses, the state would be required to engage in
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance” of these
aid recipients.61 The Court concluded that “[t]hese prophylactic contacts will
involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church,”
which could not be sustained under the Establishment Clause.62
Finally, the Court determined an impermissible entanglement
inhered in a provision of the Rhode Island statute that excluded eligibility for
teachers who worked at nonpublic schools “whose average per-pupil
expenditures on secular education equal[ed] or exceed[ed] the comparable
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
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figures for public schools.”63 To determine eligibility, the state was required
to examine the church schools’ records to apportion expenditures to either
secular education or religious activity.64 The Court was clear that “[t]his kind
of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a religious
organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution
forbids.”65 The entanglement at the heart of the Court’s concern was not an
excessive overrunning of government by religion or a church; instead, it was
“a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of
church schools and hence of churches.”66 Consequently, the Court stated
it could not “ignore . . . the danger that pervasive modern governmental power
will ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with the Religion
Clauses” through the state enforcement of this provision of the Rhode Island
statute.67
2. The Entanglement Analysis of the Pennsylvania Statute
Next, the Court determined that the Pennsylvania statute was
a violation of the Establishment Clause as it failed to pass muster under the
entanglement prong of the precedential framework.68 The Pennsylvania
statute provided direct reimbursement to nonpublic schools for their secular
education expenditures in the form of “teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials.”69 Like the Rhode Island statutory analysis, the Court
found “the very [statutory] restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure
that teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to entanglements
between church and state.”70 Also, like the Rhode Island law, the
Pennsylvania statute required the state to examine church-related school
accounts to distinguish the costs of secular services from those of religious
instruction.71 These factors violated the entanglement prong.72
The Pennsylvania statute had “the further defect of providing state
financial aid directly to the church-related schools.”73 This fact alone
distinguished the statute from those at issue in Board of Education v. Allen
and Everson, where “state aid was provided to the student[s] and [their]
parents—not to the church-related school.”74 This direct and continuing cash
subsidy, as well as its “comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls”
of secular education eligibility and post-audit inspection of the “church63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 620.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 607, 620.
Id. at 609–10.
Id. at 620–21.
See id. at 621.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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related school’s financial records[,] . . . create[d] an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state” in violation of the entanglement prong
and, therefore, the Establishment Clause.75
3. Divisive Political Potential of Both the Rhode Island and the
Pennsylvania Statutes As Further Proof of Impermissible
Entanglement of Government with Religion
The Court concluded its Establishment Clause analysis of both
statutes by finding that “[a] broader base of entanglement . . . is presented by
the divisive political potential of these state programs.”76 Given the
significant number of pupils within each state that attended church-related
schools that were impacted by these statutes, the Court determined that
the state assistance provided by these laws would, no doubt, engender
“political divisions along religious lines[, which] was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”77 The
Court determined that this was hazardous; “a threat to the normal political
process,” in conflict with the history of the nation; and contrary to the intent
of the “Constitution’s authors [who] sought to protect religious worship from
the pervasive power of government” and “political division along religious
lines.”78 As a result, the Court—in a nod to Everson, which was at “the verge”
of constitutional propriety—determined these two statutes went beyond this
threshold.79 The notion of a progression argument towards the establishment
of state churches and state religion was persuasive to the Court here because
“involvement or entanglement between government and religion serves as
a warning signal” of the “evil against which the Religion Clauses were
intended to protect.”80 The Court emphasized that this was a momentum that
can be difficult to stop, especially when there is “difficulty of perceiving in
advance exactly where the ‘verge’ of the precipice lies.”81
4. Conclusion
In the opinion’s conclusion, the Court emphasized the enormous
contributions that church-related schools had made to the nation and made
clear that its opinion did not disparage these educational entities.82
After doing so, the Court stated the key issue of the case was not “[t]he merits
and benefits of these schools.”83 Instead, “[t]he sole question [was] whether

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
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state aid to these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion
Clauses.”84 In answering that question, the Court concluded:
Under our system the choice has been made that government
is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious
instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of
government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice, and that while some
involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be
drawn.85
Here, the line was drawn at impermissible and excessive entanglement with
these statutes, and the Court determined that they both violated the
Establishment Clause.86
III. THE LEGACY OF LEMON
A. Applications of Lemon and Alternative Approaches in Supreme
Court Education Law Establishment Clause Cases
After Lemon was decided, the Supreme Court applied its threepronged purpose, primary effect, and entanglement test in multiple education
law Establishment Clause decisions.87 According to Justice Blackmun, in the
twenty years after Lemon, the Court decided thirty-one Establishment Clause
cases—thirty of which relied upon the principles in Lemon.88 These decisions
included both cases that analyzed the Establishment Clause in the context of
the provision of state financial aid to church-related schools or their attendees,
as well as cases involving religious exercises in public schools.89

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id. The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Rehearing that was filed in the case after the issuance
of its opinion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 404 U.S. 876, 876 (1971) (denying the motion for supplemental
opinion and petition for rehearing).
87
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (applying the Lemon test in a school law Establishment Clause case); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. 203; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
88
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (providing these
Supreme Court decision statistics). The lone noted exception was Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
89
Valerie C. Brannon, Evaluating Federal Financial Assistance Under the Constitution’s Religion
Clauses, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Sep. 9, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46517.pdf; see Lee, 505 U.S. at
603 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting in the twenty years after the Lemon decision “no case involving
religious activities in public schools . . . failed to apply vigorously the Lemon factors”).
85
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1. Post-Lemon Establishment Clause Cases Involving Provision of
Public Aid to Religiously-Affiliated Schools or Their Attendees’
Families
Building upon its findings in Everson, Allen, and Lemon, the Supreme
Court took up several decisions throughout the 1970s that used the
three-pronged Lemon test to analyze the constitutionality of state statutes that
directly or indirectly provided conditional reimbursements or grants to private
church-related schools or their attendees.90 These decisions found both
violations of and compliance with the Establishment Clause.91
For example, in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court found that a New York law authorizing
“direct money grants from the State to ‘qualifying’ nonpublic schools
[including sectarian schools] to be used for the ‘maintenance and repair of . . .
school facilities and equipment to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of
enrolled pupils’” was a violation of the Establishment Clause, because it had
the primary effect of advancing religion under the second prong of Lemon.92
Similarly, it found New York’s direct aid tuition reimbursement program
to parents of children in nonpublic schools also failed this effect test because
the “effect of the aid [was] unmistakably to provide desired financial support
for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.”93
On the same day, the Court used the Lemon test in Sloan v. Lemon
to evaluate the Pennsylvania Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic
Education.94 The Act directly reimbursed parents of students in nonpublic
K-12 schools for part of tuition expenses, which was designed to “avoid the
‘entanglement’ problem that flawed its prior [invalidated] aid statute.”95
The Court declared the law, which provided aid to families in a state where
more than 90% of the nonpublic schoolchildren attended religiously-affiliated
schools, unconstitutional because its primary effect advanced religion.96
Unlike the provision of bus transportation in Everson or secular
textbooks in Allen, this tuition grant program “preserve[d] and support[ed]

90
See infra notes 92–100 and accompanying text; see also Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 474, 479, 482 (1973) (finding that a New York statute that allowed for state
reimbursement of student testing and recordkeeping costs to private church-related schools had
“the primary effect of advancing religion” in violation of the Establishment Clause Lemon test); New York
v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (applying Lemon in a case involving the provision of public
aid to nonpublic religiously-affiliated schools for state-mandated recordkeeping and testing services).
91
See generally Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan,
413 U.S. 825; Regan, 444 U.S. 646.
92
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762, 773–74 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13).
93
Id. at 780, 783.
94
Sloan, 413 U.S. at 827.
95
Id. at 827, 829.
96
See id. at 830, 835.
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religion-oriented institutions,” going beyond the “verge” of constitutional
permissibility.97
However, the Court also applied Lemon in some of these public aid
school law cases to conclude that they did pass muster under the
three-pronged framework. For example, in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, the Supreme Court analyzed a New York
statute passed after the Court had struck down its predecessor through the use
of the Lemon test.98 This law “authoriz[ed] the use of public funds
to reimburse church-sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for performing
various testing and reporting services mandated by state law.”99
Applying Lemon, the Court determined the statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it had a secular purpose and effect, and it did
not create excessive entanglement between government and religion.100
Similarly, in the 1983 Mueller v. Allen decision, the Court used
Lemon to determine a Minnesota statute that permitted a tax deduction for
education-related expenses was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.101
Here, the Court outlined how the three-part Lemon test guided the general
nature of the Court’s inquiry involving the Establishment Clause and public
benefits being directed to the families of children in nonpublic parochial
schools.102 While noting the Lemon test was “well settled,” the Court also
found that Lemon “provide[d] ‘no more than a helpful signpost’ in dealing
with Establishment Clause challenges.”103 It then proceeded to apply the
Lemon prongs to determine that the law did have a secular purpose, did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion, and did “not ‘excessively
entangle’ the state in religion.”104
However, the Lemon test has not been applied in all cases involving
the provision of government benefits to and tax exemptions for religiouslyaffiliated nonpublic schools or their attendees. For example, in the 1993
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District case, the Court determined that
the state provision of a sign-language interpreter to a hearing-impaired student
at a Roman Catholic private high school, pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause because it was a “neutral government program dispensing aid not to
schools but to individual [disabled] children.”105 Despite the underlying
97

Id. at 832 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 649 (1980) (citing Levitt v.
Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)).
99
Id. at 648.
100
See id. at 648, 653, 657, 660 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)).
101
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390, 394 (1983).
102
See id. at 394.
103
Id. (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
104
See id. at 394–403 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
105
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3, 13–14 (1993).
98
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circuit court’s application of Lemon, the Supreme Court did not apply it or
even reference it in its analysis.106
Four years later, in Agostini v. Felton—another case involving
the provision of public aid to nonpublic religiously affiliated schools—the
Court applied a modified Lemon test when analyzing the constitutionality of
New York City’s provision of public school teachers for remedial educational
instruction in parochial schools pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965.107 Here, the Court stated that the
evaluation of whether government aid violates the Establishment Clause
requires the inquiry of “whether the government acted with the purpose of
advancing or inhibiting religion” and “whether the aid has the ‘effect’
of advancing or inhibiting religion.”108 Although the Court did not cite Lemon
for these propositions, the first two prongs of the Lemon framework are
clearly the foundation for these inquiries.109 Rather than squarely addressing
the government’s purpose, the Court determined that the program did not have
“the impermissible effect of advancing religion.”110 From there, the Court
addressed the excessive entanglement issue, which it deemed a consistent and
necessary aspect of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.111 It found that it
had “considered entanglement both in the course of assessing whether an aid
program [had] an impermissible effect of advancing religion” and “as a factor
separate and apart from ‘effect.’”112 The Court noted that both approaches
were similar as they examined the characteristics of the benefited institution
and the nature of the state aid.113
Rather than treating this inquiry independently, the Court folded
the third prong of Lemon into the second prong to treat entanglement
“as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.”114 In doing so, the Court
determined that there would be no need for pervasive monitoring of the Title I
teachers to ensure that they would not “inculcate religion simply because they
happen to be in a sectarian environment.”115 Consequently, the Court held that
there was no excessive entanglement.116
The 1999 plurality decision in Mitchell v. Helms utilized the Agostini
two-factor approach—rather than the Lemon three-pronged approach—
to uphold a federal school-aid program that distributed funds to government
106

See id. at 5, 10–11.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–35 (1997).
108
Id. at 222–23.
109
Id. at 222, 232.
110
Id. at 230.
111
See id. at 232–35.
112
Id. at 232 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–613 (1971)).
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 234.
116
See id.
107
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agencies to loan educational materials to public and private schools, which
included many religiously-affiliated schools.117 The plurality of the Court
stated, “Agostini . . . modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools
and examined only the first and second factors . . . .”118 Given the
commonality of considerations in the second and third prongs of this test,
the Court stated it “recast Lemon’s entanglement inquiry as simply one
criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect.”119
Finally, in the Court’s last-to-date substantive analysis of a disputed
Establishment Clause claim, the majority made no reference to Lemon.120
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris involved an Ohio program that provided tuition
aid to eligible families for students to attend public or private schools of their
choice.121 Instead of citing Lemon, it applied the Agostini factors to determine
whether the law had the “‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting
religion.”122 In doing so, the Court determined: (1) the program “was enacted
for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor
children in a demonstrably failing public school system”; and (2) it did not
have an impermissible effect of advancing or inhibiting religion as it was
“a program of true private choice” that was “entirely neutral with respect to
religion.”123 Therefore, it was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.124
While Zelman has been painted as being completely non-reflective of
Lemon, this view was not shared by Justice O’Connor in her concurring
opinion.125 She expressly recognized that the test employed by the majority
was not a “major departure from this Court’s prior Establishment Clause
jurisprudence” and, instead, was the modified Lemon test from Agostini,
which merely “folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary
effect inquiry.”126 Justice O’Connor, who authored the majority opinion in
Agostini, also noted that “[a] central tool in our analysis of cases in this area
has been the Lemon test.”127

117

See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 807.
119
Id. at 808.
120
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–63 (2002). Although the Court has reviewed cases
involving the provision of public benefits that can be used for K-12 private religious school tuition since
Zelman, those cases were determined on standing grounds or did not present adverse positions on the
application of the Establishment Clause. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246,
2254 (2020) (noting the lack of dispute on the permissibility of a K-12 state scholarship program under the
Establishment Clause); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011) (resolving an
Establishment Clause challenge to a state K-12 school tuition tax credit program on standing grounds).
121
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645.
122
Id.at 648–49 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997)).
123
Id. at 649, 662–63.
124
See id. at 663.
125
See id. at 668–70 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
126
See id. at 668 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222–23; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612–13 (1971)).
127
Id.
118
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2. Post-Lemon Establishment Clause Cases Involving Religious
Exercises in Public Schools
The Court also applied the Lemon test to a series of education law
decisions involving religious exercises in public schools, where much of the
analysis focused on the secular legislative purpose prong of Lemon. In its
1980 Stone v. Graham memorandum opinion, the Court determined that
a Kentucky statute that required “the posting of a copy of the
Ten Commandments” in every public school classroom violated the
secular purpose prong of Lemon and was, therefore, unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause.128 Analogously, in its 1985 decision of
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court found that an Alabama prayer and meditation
statute violated the Establishment Clause, as it failed the secular purpose
prong of Lemon. 129 Here, the Court found that the “statute had no secular
purpose,” as the express purpose of the legislation was “‘to return voluntary
prayer’ to the public schools.”130 Similarly, in its 1987 Edwards v. Aguillard
decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lemon test, where it found that
a Louisiana creationism statute failed to pass constitutional muster under that
test’s first prong.131
The Court continued to apply Lemon in its education law
jurisprudence for decades after the decision. For example, in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, the Court’s last-to-date religious
activities in public schools case, the Court referenced the Lemon factors as
the general guides for Establishment Clause analysis.132 It then utilized the
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test to determine a school district’s policy
that permitted the delivery of a student invocation prior to football games was
an Establishment Clause violation.133 Here, the Court found the first prong of
Lemon was not satisfied because
the text of the . . . policy alone reveals that it has an
unconstitutional purpose. The plain language of the policy
clearly spells out the extent of school involvement in both the
election of the speaker and the content of the message.
Additionally, the . . . policy specifies only one, clearly
preferred message—that of Santa Fe’s traditional religious
“invocation.” Finally, the extremely selective access of the
policy and other content restrictions confirm that it is not

128

Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39, 41–42 (1980).
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 60–61 (1985).
130
Id. at 56–57 (emphasis added).
131
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580, 582–83, 583 n.4, 596–97 (1987).
132
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000) (quoting Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983)).
133
See id. at 314–16.
129
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a content-neutral regulation that creates a limited public
forum [for student speech].134
The Court concluded the purpose of the policy was to “endors[e] school
prayer.”135 Thus, the “simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose and
perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional
violation.”136
Despite the numerous majority opinions by the Supreme Court that
cited and used Lemon to analyze education law Establishment Clause claims,
the Lemon test was not used in all of the education law cases that followed
Santa Fe. For example, the Court in Lee v. Weisman used neutrality and
coercion analyses, rather than the Lemon test, to determine that a Rhode Island
policy allowing public school administrators to invite clergy members
to deliver prayers at middle and high school graduation ceremonies was
a violation of the Establishment Clause.137 The Lee Court, however,
expressly declined the litigants’ request to reconsider Lemon; instead, it found
that the pervasiveness of the government involvement in religious activity
“to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise
in a public school . . . suffice[d] to determine the question” of
constitutionality.138
B. Criticisms of Lemon and American Legion v. American Humanist
Association
Due in part to the lack of a uniform application of the Lemon test in
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the case has
become a target for derision by some jurists and scholars.139 Justice Scalia
repeatedly drove “pencils through the [Lemon] creature’s heart.”140 Judge
Easterbrook deemed the Lemon standards to be “hopelessly open-ended.”141
Professors argued the case created doctrinal chaos by transforming this area
of First Amendment decision-making into an area of “unstructured
expansiveness.”142

134

Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
Id. at 315.
136
Id. at 316.
137
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 587–88 (1992).
138
Id. at 587.
139
See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (pejoratively referring to the “brain-spun ‘Lemon test’”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys . . . .”).
140
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141
Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
142
See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 118–20
(1992); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380–88 (1981).
135
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For these critics, many found Lemon’s reckoning day with the Court’s
decision in American Legion v. American Humanist Association.143
In American Legion, a majority of the Court agreed that the
Bladensburg Peace Cross, a public memorial for soldiers who lost their lives
in World War I, was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.144
This decision produced seven different opinions: six in support of the view
that there was no Establishment Clause violation and one in dissent.145
Among these fractured opinions, one of the few points of consensus is that the
decision did not expressly overrule Lemon in its entirety.146 Justice Thomas,
one of Lemon’s most vocal critics, acknowledged this in his concurrence,
stating that the Court should have instead “overrule[d] the Lemon test in all
contexts.”147
While the Court did not expressly overrule Lemon, a majority of
the Justices did agree that Lemon is no longer the appropriate constitutional
test for public religious displays and monuments. Here, the plurality wrote
that although “Lemon ambitiously attempted to distill from the Court’s
existing case law a test that would bring order and predictability to
Establishment Clause decisionmaking,” it had “shortcomings” that were
evidenced by the Court’s post-Lemon declinations to use the test in some
cases.148 For this plurality, it was clear “the Lemon test [alone] could not
resolve” the multitudinous array of Establishment Clause cases appealed to
the Court.149 It emphasized the harsh criticism of the test by several Justices,
and it noted that Lemon had been “lamented by lower court judges[] and
questioned by a diverse roster of scholars.”150
As a result, the plurality determined that cases “that involve the use,
for ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative purposes, of words or
symbols with religious association,” like the one before it, should not be
analyzed under Lemon.151 Instead, lower courts should use an “application of
a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols,
and practices.”152 The plurality “look[ed] to history for guidance” and used
Marsh v. Chambers, which “conspicuously ignored Lemon,” as its
See generally Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
Id. at 2074, 2090.
145
See generally id. Given the number of these opinions, it can be difficult at first read to assess
a clear understanding of the common ground of the Justices in resolving this issue. See Kondrat’yev v.
City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting this difficulty). What is of critical
importance to this Article is whether the Court reached any consensus in this case on the place of Lemon
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
146
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2097–98 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting what the Court failed
to do).
147
Id. at 2097.
148
Id. at 2080 (plurality opinion). Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Kavanaugh in this plurality opinion. Id. at 2074.
149
Id. at 2080.
150
Id. at 2081.
151
Id. at 2081–82.
152
Id.
143
144
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paradigmatic example of this approach.153 This ended the plurality’s
discussion of Lemon—without a directive that Lemon was expressly
overruled in its entirety.
Although he joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, Justice Kavanaugh
also wrote a concurring opinion that argued the “Court no longer applies the
old test articulated in Lemon.”154 In doing so, he claimed that the Lemon test,
if “fairly applied,” does not provide an adequate explanation for any of the
Court’s Establishment Clause decisions since its first articulation.155
However, in discussing education law cases within these decisions, Justice
Kavanaugh seemed to round off the edges of his conclusions. With respect
to cases that involve “government benefits and tax exemptions [that go to]
religious organizations,” he wrote the outcomes in those cases “are not easily
reconciled with Lemon.”156 However, he cited Mueller v. Allen here, which
expressly applied the three-pronged Lemon test to uphold a state law.157
In school prayer cases, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the Court applied
a coercion analysis rather than Lemon.158 Here, he omitted the use of Lemon
in Santa Fe’s holding on the unconstitutionality of government-sponsored
school prayers, and he also omitted the other religious exercises in schools
jurisprudence that applied Lemon.159 By obscuring or omitting precedent that
did not fit within his world view, Justice Kavanaugh concluded that “the
Court’s decisions over the span of several decades demonstrate that the
Lemon test is not good law . . . .”160 However, Justice Kavanaugh did not
close the loop on this analysis by expressly calling for the overruling of
Lemon.161
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence focused on standing.162 However,
he still waded into the mire, stating the plurality correctly found that Lemon
“was a misadventure.”163 Justice Gorsuch called Lemon a “mess”; asserted
that “no one has any idea about the answers to [the Lemon] questions”;
referenced the score of individuals who criticized the case and called for its
removal; and noted that none of the Justices could “defend Lemon against
these criticisms . . . .”164 He summarized the plurality’s directives to lower
153
See id. at 2087 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). In Marsh, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Nebraska Legislature’s use of an official chaplain to begin each legislative session
with a prayer. See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
154
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
155
See id.
156
Id. at 2092–93.
157
See id. at 2092 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota law
that permitted state deductions for tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses related to K-12 education,
including private religious education)).
158
See id. at 2093 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
159
See id..
160
Id.
161
See id. at 2093–94.
162
See generally id. at 2098–103 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 2101.
164
Id.
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courts this way: apply Town of Greece and not Lemon when assessing the
constitutionality of religiously expressive public monuments, symbols, or
practices.165 Yet, although he deemed “Lemon now shelved,” he did not
determine that it was now expressly and entirely overruled.166
Unlike his colleagues, Justice Thomas did call for Lemon to be
expressly overruled in his concurring opinion. Justice Thomas agreed with
the plurality’s rejection of the “long-discredited” Lemon test for claims
“involving ‘religious references or imagery in public monuments, symbols,
mottos, displays, and ceremonies.’”167 However, he “would take the logical
next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts” for three reasons.168
First, the “test has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution.”169
Second, it “has been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to
achieve.”170 And third, it “continues to cause enormous confusion in the
States and the lower courts.”171 To Justice Thomas, it was obvious that Lemon
“does not provide a sound basis for judging Establishment Clause claims.”172
However, the underlying circuit court’s application of Lemon signaled to him
that it was not obvious to everyone.173 Consequently, Justice Thomas wrote,
“It is our job to say what the law is, and because the Lemon test is not good
law, we ought to say so.”174
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, did not
mention Lemon.175 Neither did Justice Breyer in his separate concurring
opinion, but he did reassert his longstanding adherence to the principle
“that there is no single formula for resolving Establishment Clause
challenges.”176 Still, he joined Justice Alito’s plurality that rejected the
Lemon test for the evaluation of public monuments.177 Justice Kagan
concurred with the overall decision of the plurality but not with its opinion on
Lemon.178 While “agree[ing] that rigid application of the Lemon test does not
solve every Establishment Clause problem,” she thought that the case
demonstrated that its “focus on purposes and effects is crucial in evaluating
government action in this sphere . . . .”179

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
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See id. at 2102.
Id. at 2102–03.
Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2098.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2104–13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2074, 2080–84.
Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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C. The Impact of American Legion on Lemon
What has been the impact of American Legion on Lemon? There
is no consensus on this question either. After American Legion, several jurists
declared the official death of Lemon.180 Other courts found the Lemon test
was “sort of” dead in that it was no longer good law for the evaluation of the
constitutionality of public religious displays, ceremonies, and monuments
since those Establishment Clause cases would rely on an “approach that
focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance.”181
Still, others noted that, although Lemon was criticized, its test remains valid
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.182 Several courts have found that the
Lemon test still remains good law because the Court did not expressly
overrule it in American Legion, and they have continued to apply this test in
their evaluation of a variety of Establishment Clause claims.183
This lack of consensus on American Legion’s impact on the continued
application of Lemon is not surprising for several reasons. First, as the
Eleventh Circuit candidly stated, “[D]ivining any sort of clear rule from the
seven separate opinions in American Legion is a challenge.”184
Second, it seems that almost nothing in Establishment Clause analysis can
capture complete consensus.185 Therefore, the question of “the fate of the
Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence” has
arisen (again).186
All of the circuit courts that have squarely addressed the issue
of American Legion’s impact on the Lemon test in the context of longstanding
religiously expressive monuments, ceremonies, and displays have followed
the dictate of the six Justices in that case, rejecting such an application.187
180
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 946 (9th Cir. 2021) (Nelson, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing the “Supreme Court has effectively killed Lemon” (citing
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2067)).
181
See, e.g., Kondrat’yev v. Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087).
182
See, e.g., Janny v. Gamez, 8 F.4th 883, 904 (10th Cir. 2021).
183
E.g., Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 528–29 (E.D. Ky. 2020);
Case v. Ivey, 542 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 2021).
184
Kondrat’yev, 949 F.3d at 1325.
185
See Amanda Harmon Cooley, Framers’ Fidelity and Thicket Theory in Educational Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 58 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (2021) (discussing the fractured state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and its scholarly commentary).
186
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005); see also University of Dayton School of Law
Symposium: Lemon at 50: Has the Supreme Court Soured on Its Bitter Fruits? (Sep. 24, 2021) (on file with
the University of Dayton Law Review) (posing a question on the fate of Lemon); Derrick R. Freijomil,
Comment, Has the Court Soured on Lemon?: A Look into the Future of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 141, 201 (1994) (questioning whether Lemon would continue
to be used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
187
See Woodring v. Jackson Cnty., 986 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying American Legion,
rather than Lemon, to uphold the constitutionality of a nativity scene on government property);
Kondrat’yev, 949 F.3d at 1321 (applying American Legion to find that Lemon is no longer good law for
Establishment Clause cases involving religious public monuments and holding that the presence of a cross
on city property does not violate the Establishment Clause); Perrier-Bilbo v. United States, 954 F.3d 413,
424 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 818 (2020) (holding that American Legion expressly rejected
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However, several of these courts have also acknowledged that Lemon is still
good law in other contexts. For example, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that, while “unpopular” and “often . . . unhelpful,” Lemon “has never [been]
formally overruled” by the Court.188 The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged
the continued precedential value and existence of Lemon, noting that, while
the case is “certainly not the exclusive” test for all Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, it “remains a central framework for Establishment Clause
challenges.”189 Further, the Tenth Circuit expressly applied the Lemon test
to determine that a police officer’s directive to a criminal defendant to
“Praise the Lord” was not an Establishment Clause violation.190 In doing so,
the court acknowledged American Legion’s failure to “offer a replacement
test,” even though it “cast doubt on the viability of the Lemon test . . . .”191
The only circuit court to evaluate an education law Establishment
Clause claim after American Legion was the Ninth Circuit. However, in these
two decisions, the court avoided any references to either American Legion or
Lemon.192 In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the Ninth Circuit rejected
a free exercise claim and found that the Establishment Clause required
a public school district to stop one of its high school coaches from praying on
the school football field with many of his players after games.193 In doing so,
the court relied on Santa Fe rather than American Legion or Lemon.194
Similarly, in California Parents for the Equalization of Educational
Materials v. Torlakson, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that state
history-social science standards violated the Establishment Clause by
applying Lee rather than Lemon or American Legion.195
Although there have been no circuit court decisions that have
squarely addressed American Legion’s impact on Lemon in education law
cases, the Lemon test has been cited and used approvingly in several district
courts’ Establishment Clause decisions regarding institutions of higher

Lemon for these cases and holding that “the phrase ‘so help me God’ in the naturalization oath” was not
a violation of the Establishment Clause); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 933 F.3d
275, 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding the same inapplicability of Lemon to this category of cases per
American Legion and upholding the constitutionality of a 75-year-old county seal that featured a Latin
cross).
188
Woodring, 986 F.3d at 988 (citing Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080–81
(2019)).
189
Janny v. Gamez, 8 F.4th 883, 904 (10th Cir. 2021).
190
Aguilera v. City of Colo. Springs, 836 F. App’x 665, 669–70 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied (citing
Medina v. Cath. Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1230 (10th Cir. 2017).
191
Id. at 670 n.7.
192
See generally Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021); Cal. Parents for the
Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Torlakson, 973 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2583
(2021).
193
Kennedy, 991 F.3d at 1009–10.
194
See id. at 1017 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)).
195
Cal. Parents for the Equalization of Educ. Materials, 973 F.3d at 1021 (citing Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)).
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education and K-12 schools. For example, in Irish 4 Reproductive Health v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana used the Lemon test to
determine there was a plausible claim for relief that a federal settlement
agreement exempting the University of Notre Dame from federal
contraceptive provision regulations violated the Establishment Clause.196
Similarly, in Sabra v. Maricopa County Community College District,
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona also used the
Lemon test to dismiss an Establishment Clause claim contesting a module that
discussed Islamic terrorism in a community college world politics class.197
In a similar decision by the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, the district court used the Lemon test to find that
the inclusion of materials on Islam in a world religion unit at a K-12 public
school did not violate the Establishment Clause.198 Here, in Hilsenrath ex rel.
C.H. v. School District of Chathams, the court noted while the
“Establishment Clause test is in flux,” Lemon has long been the general
default test.199 Further, it found the Lemon test to be the appropriate test for
the analysis of the Establishment Clause in the “public school context.”200
At least three additional district courts have taken the same analytical
approach in evaluating Establishment Clause claims in the K-12 public school
context since American Legion. In Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v.
Beshear, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
applied the Lemon test to determine that an Establishment Clause claim was
unlikely to invalidate the Kentucky governor’s executive order that
transitioned schools to virtual learning to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.201
In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mercer County Board of
Education, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia also stated that Lemon was the applicable test for evaluating
Establishment Clause claims that arise out of religious exercises in public
schools.202
Finally, in Coble ex rel. J.H.C. v. Lake Norman Charter School, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
196
Irish 4 Reprod. Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 434 F. Supp. 3d 683, 693, 709
(N.D. Ind. 2020).
197
Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 479 F. Supp. 3d 808, 817 (D. Ariz. 2020).
198
Hilsenrath ex rel. C.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Chathams, 500 F. Supp. 3d 272, 289–90 (D.N.J. 2020).
199
Id. at 289.
200
Id. at 289–90 (quoting Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2011)).
201
Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 529 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (“The Order
[had] the secular purpose of slowing the spread of COVID-19; it [had] the primary effect of limiting school
gatherings—both secular and religious; and Danville Christian develop[ed] no substantive argument that
Governor Beshear’s Order foster[ed] government entanglement with religion.”).
202
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:17-00642,
2021 WL 1169378, at *8 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2021) (denying a motion to dismiss an Establishment
Clause claim based on a Bibles in Schools program).
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expressly applied Lemon, rather than American Legion, to an Establishment
Clause claim arising out of teaching a book of poetry at a public school.203
Here, the plaintiff urged the court to use Van Orden v. Perry and American
Legion, rather than Lemon, to evaluate the Establishment Clause claim.204
The court instead found that it “is clear that Lemon controls the Establishment
Clause analysis in cases involving curriculum in public schools,” given the
lack of any analogous facts to Van Orden and American Legion. 205 Finally,
the court noted that Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in American Legion
“fail[ed] to cite any school curriculum cases that do not expressly rely
on Lemon.”206 It subsequently determined there was no Establishment Clause
violation.207
Based on this case survey, there is a consensus among lower federal
courts that Lemon is no longer good law for Establishment Clause cases
involving religiously expressive public displays, monuments, and
ceremonies. However, these same courts still cite Lemon as one interpretive
approach that remains good Establishment Clause law, especially for
education law cases.
IV. WHY DOES LEMON PERSIST?
The question that needs answering is not: “Is Lemon a nullity?”
Lemon is still being applied post-American Legion—at least in some
education law cases, which do not involve claims arising out of religiously
expressive public displays, monuments, and ceremonies. Instead, the key
question is: “Why does Lemon persist?” The answer is actually a simple and
straightforward one: the Supreme Court. Lemon persists because, for half
a century, the Court has been unable to acquire a majority consensus in
a unitary opinion to expressly overrule Lemon in its entirety, despite being
sufficiently able to find a majority to overrule other cases during those fifty
years. As a result, under the hierarchical precedent doctrine, Lemon remains
good law for the resolution of education law cases by lower federal courts.
Further, until the Supreme Court expressly overrules Lemon in its entirety,
it is appropriate for federal courts to continue applying Lemon as one
interpretive tool in this notoriously difficult decision-making area of school
law. Any criticism of lower federal courts that do so, especially by the Court
itself, is hollow criticism indeed.
The next inquiry must include a determination of why the Court has
been unable to end the legacy of Lemon despite many instances of its own
203
Coble v. Lake Norman Charter Sch. Inc., No. 3:20-CV-00596-MOC-DSC, 2021 WL 1685969,
at *7, n.3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2021).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at *12.
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members calling for such a fate. The answer to that question has everything
to do with Lemon’s past—specifically, the fact that Lemon was an appropriate
(yet not perfect) synthesis of the Court’s existing Establishment Clause
precedent, which was to be used as just one analytical guideline. It was never
designed to be the exclusive test for these cases. Additionally, this alignment
of Lemon with foundational and seminal First Amendment case law,
especially in the area of education law, is likely the reason for the Court’s
inability to expressly overrule it in its entirety.
A. Lower Courts Are Appropriately Applying Lemon in Education Law
Establishment Clause Cases Under the Hierarchical Precedent
Doctrine
“The truth is, the fault lies here.”208 These are the words
Justice Gorsuch used in his concurring opinion in American Legion to
acknowledge the Court’s culpability in lower courts’ confusion about core
Establishment Clause standing principles.209 The Court is equally culpable in
allowing Lemon to persist, especially in light of the criticism that has been
levied against it by so many of its Justices. Quite simply, Lemon persists
because the Court has been unable to acquire a majority consensus in a unitary
opinion to expressly overrule it in its entirety. Even Justice Scalia, one of
Lemon’s most vociferous critics, tacitly acknowledged that the Court had not
expressly overruled the decision in a single majority opinion.210 Therefore,
under the hierarchical precedent doctrine, Lemon is still good law for
education law cases, and it is appropriate for the lower federal courts to
continue to apply it.211
The Court has not mentioned Lemon in a majority opinion since
American Legion. In fact, there have only been three references to Lemon by
any Supreme Court justice after American Legion, all by Justice Thomas.
Each of these references either implicitly or expressly recognize that the
“Court has not overruled Lemon.”212 Lower federal courts have used this
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2101 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See id.
See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[A] majority of the Justices on the current Court (including at least one Member of today’s majority)
have, in separate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon test’ that embodies the supposed principle
of neutrality between religion and irreligion.”) (emphasis added); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Over the years, however, no fewer than
five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the
[Lemon] creature’s heart (the author of today’s opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing
so.”) (emphasis added).
211
See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399.
212
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1520 n.10 (2020); see also Our Lady
of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2070 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (derisively
referencing the phenomenon of the “Court usually [going] to great lengths to avoid governmental
‘entanglement’ with religion, particularly in its Establishment Clause cases”); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2265 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the “infamous test in Lemon”
as part of his disavowal of the endorsement test).
208
209
210

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss3/4

2022]

The Persistence of Lemon

437

same reason for their continued use of Lemon after American Legion in
establishment cases, like school law cases, that do not consider the
constitutionality of religiously expressive public monuments, displays, or
ceremonies.213 Because the Supreme Court has only thrown stones and failed
to take the one necessary step to stop the application of Lemon in education
law cases, the continued judicial usage of the Lemon test is a valid approach
that complies with the hierarchical precedent doctrine.
The straightforward hierarchical precedent doctrine stands in stark
contrast to the labyrinthine Establishment Clause doctrine. Under this
doctrine, lower courts are bound by controlling higher courts’ relevant
precedent.214 This axiomatic doctrine with a tandem application of the
Supremacy Clause has created an indefeasible rule of constitutional law that
all lower federal courts and all state courts are required to adhere to
the precedent created by the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions.215
This foundational principle of the American judicial system is not
controversial, even within the polemical state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.216 It is a key judicial tenet “grounded in formalism . . . .”217
As a result, the Supreme Court’s constitutional precedents remain binding on
all of the courts in the nation “until [the Court] sees fit to reexamine
[them].”218
Lower federal courts are acting in accordance with this hierarchical
precedent doctrine through their application of Lemon in religious exercises
in public school cases or the modified Lemon test as stated in Agostini in cases
213
See Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 528–29 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (noting
that although the Lemon test has been criticized by the Court, “it has not been officially overruled, and the
Sixth Circuit has stated that it is still the proper test for analyzing claims involving the Establishment
Clause”); Irish 4 Reprod. Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 434 F. Supp. 3d 683, 709
(N.D. Ind. 2020) (“Although the Lemon test has been much criticized, the Seventh Circuit continues to
faithfully apply it.”).
214
See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995) (articulating this binding precedent
rule).
215
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 47 n.26 (1985) (“Federal district
courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court.” (quoting
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982))); Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method
and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1850 (2013) (labeling this rule “indefeasible
and absolute”).
216
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and
the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 969 (2000) (discussing the basic accord on the
principle of hierarchical precedent in constitutional analysis); Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to
Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 189 (2016)
(deeming the “Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence . . . largely incoherent”); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713 (2001) (discussing
the lack of “unified Establishment Clause doctrine”); Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the
Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 674 (1992) (stating
“the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause case law has reached the point where it is described on all sides as
confused, inconsistent, and incoherent”).
217
Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law
of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 441 (2019).
218
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1B ¶ 0.402[1], at I–10 (2d ed. 1996).
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involving the provision of public aid to religiously-affiliated schools.
Any criticism by the Supreme Court of the continued use of Lemon lacks
resonance because: (1) the Court is the genesis of the case; (2) it is the cause
for its persistence; and (3) it is the creator of the judicial inefficiencies that
flow from any reversals of lower courts’ use of the Lemon test pursuant to the
hierarchical precedent doctrine. We need only look to Justice Scalia to
acknowledge the Court’s culpability here:
But the Court’s snub of Lemon today (it receives only two
“see also” citations, in the course of the opinion’s description
of Grendel’s Den) is particularly noteworthy because all
three courts below (who are not free to ignore Supreme Court
precedent at will) relied on it, and the parties (also bound by
our case law) dedicated over 80 pages of briefing to the
application and continued vitality of the Lemon test. In
addition to the other sound reasons for abandoning Lemon, it
seems quite inefficient for this Court, which in reaching its
decisions relies heavily on the briefing of the parties and, to
a lesser extent, the opinions of lower courts, to mislead lower
courts and parties about the relevance of the Lemon test.219
If such an ardent critic of Lemon can acknowledge the Court’s role in the
persistence of the Lemon case, there has to be a reason underlying the Court’s
continued failure to overrule this case completely.
B. The Supreme Court Likely Has Not Expressly Overruled Lemon in
Its Entirety Based on the Case’s Precedential Alignment with the
Court’s Foundational Education Law Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
Amidst all of this criticism of Lemon, why has the Supreme Court not
expressly overruled it in the last fifty years? The answer to this question is
directly connected to Lemon’s past—specifically, the case’s precedential
alignment with the Court’s seminal education law Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, starting with Everson. Further, the Lemon test’s first two
prongs are a direct outgrowth of the Allen test, which was an express adoption
of the Schempp secular purpose and neutrality primary effect test, and its third
prong is an imperfect reiteration of the Walz v. Tax Commission holding.
While the third prong is a modification of a case outside of the area of
education law (but reflective of precedent analyzing a government benefit to
a religiously-affiliated institution), this prong also reflects the Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education decision’s essential findings on the need for
freedom from governmental entanglements with religion.

219

Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 750–51 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Why does this precedential alignment matter to the continued
persistence of Lemon? It matters because the effect of an express overruling
of a test, which directly reflects a multitude of the Court’s foundational
Establishment Clause cases, could create a significant ripple effect throughout
this area of education law. By doing so, the Court could weaken an already
unstable area of its First Amendment jurisprudence, which could lead to an
even worse jurisprudential outcome than the application of what some have
deemed a bad test.220
1. Lemon’s Foundational Alignment with Everson v. Board of
Education
At the outset of its discussion of the Establishment Clause, the Court
in Lemon cited Everson, which upheld the constitutionality of a township
board of education’s reimbursement of parents for the transportation costs to
bus their children to private Catholic parochial schools pursuant to
a New Jersey statute.221 Everson was the Court’s first extended substantive
examination of the Establishment Clause in an education law case.222
In Everson, the Court relied heavily on James Madison’s conceptions of
liberty and neutrality to determine that the objective of the First Amendment
religion clauses was “to provide . . . protection against governmental intrusion
on religious liberty.”223
This Madisonian principle “requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary.”224 Consequently, “[s]tate power is no
more to be used so as to [inhibit] religions than it is to favor them.”225
In applying this approach, the Court cited the Pierce v. Society of Sisters
fundamental right to bring up one’s child through the allowance of sending
that child to a private religious school to fulfill the parent’s obligation under
state compulsory education laws.226 This nod to Pierce provided the
foundation for the Court to conclude that the state action in Everson was not
an Establishment Clause violation as it did “no more than provide a general

220
See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“As bad as the Lemon test is, it is worse for the fact that, since its inception, its seemingly simple mandates
have been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve.”).
221
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611–12 (1971) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
3 (1947)) ; see Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 (upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that permitted
“local schools districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from school”).
222
See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 284 (2001) (stating that “[t]he modern Establishment Clause dates
from [Everson]”).
223
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
224
Id. at 18.
225
Id.
226
Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
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program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.”227
By using the “foundation of modern Establishment Clause doctrine”
as its starting point for analysis, the Court in Lemon appropriately aligned
with its seminal relevant education law precedent.228 The Court also
emphasized that the majority in Everson signaled that its decision upholding
this statute was on “‘the verge’ of forbidden territory under the Religion
Clauses.”229 Through this emphasis, Lemon reaffirmed that Everson is the
tipping point for constitutionality in related education law cases.
2. The First Two Prongs of the Lemon Test’s Alignment with Board of
Education v. Allen, School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, and Everson v. Board of Education
The Lemon Court’s reliance on established Establishment Clause
education law precedent did not end with Everson. It also expressly cited
Allen for the basis of its first two prongs.230 In Allen, the Court found that
a New York statute that required local school authorities to lend free
textbooks to all students, including students attending parochial schools, was
not a violation of the Establishment Clause because the statute had “a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.”231 This holding quoted the legislative purpose and primary effect
standard from its decision in Schempp.232
In Schempp, the Court determined that a Pennsylvania statute and
a Baltimore rule that required Bible readings in public schools violated the
Establishment Clause.233 In analyzing these religious exercises in public
schools, the Court built upon its own direct consideration of the Establishment
Clause “eight times in the past score of years” to articulate an explicit “test”:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause

227

Id.
David E. Steinberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Establishment Clause Federalism, 40 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 277, 309 (2013).
229
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
230
Id. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
231
Allen, 392 U.S. at 238, 243 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
232
Id. at 243 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203).
233
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205, 211.
228
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there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.234
Here, the Schempp court cited directly to Everson.235
This close examination of the first two prongs of the Lemon test
demonstrates that Lemon is the direct progeny of Allen, Schempp, and
Everson. These three cases are foundational within the Court’s canon of
education law Establishment Clause cases, and their overruling or significant
weakening would have a tremendous impact on the Court’s jurisprudence in
this area. Certainly, this must be one contributing factor to why the Court
continues to allow the Lemon test to be one available analytical approach for
First Amendment school law issues.
3. The Third Prong of the Lemon Test’s Alignment with Walz v. Tax
Commission, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, and
Everson v. Board of Education
This leaves the third prong of the Lemon synthesized precedential
test: “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”236 Here, the Court expressly quoted Walz v. Tax Commission, but
it did not incorporate the complete Walz proposition that the Court must
“be sure that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”237 In Agostini, the Court recognized this
difference, stating that it had “considered entanglement both in the course of
assessing whether an aid program has an impermissible effect of advancing
religion and as a factor separate and apart from ‘effect.’”238 Agostini folded
the third prong of Lemon into the second prong to treat entanglement
“as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.”239 However, the Court did
not state that the Lemon test was thereby modified in perpetuity for all
Establishment Clause cases; rather, it emphasized that both entanglement
inquiries employed similar factors.240
Walz, which upheld the constitutionality of property tax exemptions
for churches, incorporated several of the Court’s seminal education law
decisions.241 It expressly cited Everson and Engel v. Vitale as the basis for
the “development and historical background of the First Amendment.”242
234

Id. at 222.
Id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
236
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
237
See id.; Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
238
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13) (citing
Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
239
Id. at 233.
240
See id. at 232–33.
241
See Walz, 397 U.S. at 667, 672-76.
242
Id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
235
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The Court also analogized the facts of Walz to those in Everson and Allen.243
It further characterized this education law precedent as a success story in the
difficult area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about
administrative relationships between public education bodies
and church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart
a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of
religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established
religion. This is a “tight rope” and one we have successfully
traversed.244
In applying this precedent, the Court in Walz first directly applied
without citation the Schempp test and determined that “[t]he legislative
purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the
inhibition of religion . . . .”245 After determining that the exemption’s purpose
was permissible under the Establishment Clause, the Court proceeded to make
“sure that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”246 Therefore, although Schempp was not cited
expressly for the Walz entanglement gloss that was ultimately incorporated
by Lemon, its underlying framework of purpose and primary effect was
certainly present.
Further, Lemon’s incorporation of the Walz excessive entanglement
prong is the precedential progeny of the Court’s education law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This third prong can be directly tied
back to Everson, the first substantive examination of an Establishment Clause
education law claim. It also reflects McCollum, the first case to examine the
constitutionality of religious exercises in public schools.
The excessive entanglement prong of Lemon that quoted Walz
“harkens back to . . . Everson.”247 In Everson, the Court premised the
interpretation of the Establishment Clause on baseline principles that included
how “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.”248 This part of Everson aligned with “the Madisonian concern that
secular and religious authorities must not interfere with each other’s
respective spheres of choice and influence.”249 As Justice Blackmun cogently

243
244
245
246
247
248
249

See id. at 671–72.
Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.3 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 603 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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argued in his concurrence in Lee, the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon
incorporated Everson’s reflection of this Madisonian principle.250
The entanglement prong of Lemon does not just reflect Everson;
it also incorporates the Court’s first analysis of an Establishment Clause claim
related to religious exercises in public schools: McCollum.251 In McCollum,
the Court invalidated an Illinois provision requiring a weekly thirty minutes
of religious education in the public schools taught by religious teachers
employed by private religious groups.252 In its decision, the Court found
an impermissible intertwinement of the state and religion—essentially,
an excessive entanglement of government and religion.253 The Court
incorporated the key Everson neutrality principle into this analysis:
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to
aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of
their doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest
a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings.
A manifestation of such hostility would be at war with our
national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.
For the
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.254
In Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in McCollum, he wrote it was
imperative that “the public school must keep scrupulously free from
entanglement in the strife of sects” because it was “[d]esigned to serve as
perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among
a heterogeneous democratic people . . . .”255 This notion of the necessity of
freedom of the public school as an institution of the government from
entanglement with religion was also a key finding of the majority decision of
the Court in McCollum; moreover, Justice Frankfurter made clear that this
was a strongly rooted and “firmly established” principle of American
history.256

250

Id. (citation omitted).
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948).
252
See generally id.
253
Id. at 231(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
254
Id. at 211–12 (majority opinion).
255
Id. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
256
Id. at 211-12, 216-17. It is important to note, however, that the Blaine Amendment cited by
Justice Frankfurter has since been deemed a “doctrine, born of bigotry” towards Catholics.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion). For more discussion of the origins and
applications of this entanglement prong, see Stephanie H. Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH.
U.L. REV. 1701 (2020).
251
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Justice Frankfurter also relied upon Madison’s advocacy against
government and religious entanglements in his concurrence by referencing
the 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance, which is often cited as a touchstone
by the Supreme Court in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.257 In the
Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison cautioned against the accretions of the
intermeddling of state and religion and praised the Revolutionaries for their
actions at first sight of such encroachment.258 He continued to make his
disdain for entanglement of government with religion clear in 1788, during
the Virginia convention’s ratification of the Constitution, where he stated that
“there is not a shadow of right in the federal government to intermeddle with
religion. Its least interference would be a most flagrant usurpation.”259
In its incorporation of the Walz excessive entanglement prong, Lemon
relied upon core precedent in the area of the Court’s Establishment Clause
education law jurisprudence—that of Everson and McCollum with their
reflections of Madisonian neutrality that could be traced back to the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution. Consequently, like with its first two
prongs, a decision by the Court to expressly overrule Lemon would have
a significant effect on the Court’s education law Establishment Clause
foundations. This concern must be a reason why, in part, the Court has
continued to allow Lemon to persist as precedent in the area of education law.
V. WHY LEMON WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO PERSIST FOR EDUCATION LAW
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
The final question for analysis is how Lemon will fare in the future
for education law Establishment Clause cases. Based on the lower courts’
approaches in the two years since American Legion, it seems likely they will
continue to apply the Lemon test in school law cases because the test provides
a reasoned and valid foundation for decision-making. Further, it seems the
Supreme Court will continue to preserve the Lemon test as an interpretive
option for school law cases in order to avert the destabilization of this area of
jurisprudence.
A. The Lemon Test Provides a Reasoned Foundation for Judicial
Analysis of Education Law Establishment Clause Cases
In an area of law where constitutional scholars and Supreme Court
Justices struggle to perceive the lines of demarcation of state establishment of
257
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 214–17; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 605–06 (1987)
(discussing the impact of the Memorial and Remonstrance on the Virginia law).
258
See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 185–86 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)
(“Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.”).
259
Daniel A. Spiro, The Creation of a Free Marketplace of Religious Ideas: Revisiting the
Establishment Clause after the Alabama Secular Humanism Decision, 39 ALA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987)
(citations omitted).
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religion, public schools need guidance in crafting educational regulations and
evaluating claims of potential traversing of these lines. Awash in a sea of
tests and often lost in the maze of the Court’s case law, lower courts also need
an accessible analytical tool to analyze Establishment Clause cases that allows
for reasoned judgments.260 Among “every plausible textual, historical, and
policy argument” utilized by the Court in Establishment Clause cases,
the Lemon test provides one good law guideline for courts to use in reasoned
judgment of First Amendment claims outside of the American Legion
subset.261
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the impossibility of having
a universal rule for all First Amendment decision-making and has concluded
that the proper analytical approach must take place “on a case-by-case
basis.”262 The Lemon test is but one guideline in Establishment Clause
decision-making. Although it might not be the best test or the only test that
should be applied, the Lemon framework provides the lower federal courts
with precedential touchstones that dovetail with the Court’s longstanding
education law Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As a result, judicial
applications of the three-part Lemon test allow the courts to show their work
in constitutional interpretation and avoid a harmful ipse dixit or “know it when
we see it” approach to Establishment Clause determinations.263
Avoidance of decision-making that appears haphazard, inconsistent,
and inscrutable is vitally important in the area of First Amendment education
law claims because it works to protect against the perceived delegitimization
of this constitutional decision-making.264 In order to provide a just and
reasoned opinion, a court has to have a foundation upon which to reason.265
The Lemon test provides one of those foundations—a foundation that remains
good law to apply under the hierarchical precedent doctrine.
260
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming the
Establishment Clause a maze).
261
Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 88 (1963); see also Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary
Traditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841, 877–78 (2013) (outlining the necessity of reasoned judgment in
the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence).
262
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
263
Ipse Dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (defining “ipse dixit” as “‘he himself said
it’”; it is “[s]omething asserted but not proved”); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”:
The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495–98, 537 (1986) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s inconsistent, “we know it when we see it” approach to Establishment Clause interpretation since
Everson).
264
See, e.g., Amanda Harmon Cooley, Justiciability and Judicial Fiat in Establishment Clause Cases
Involving Religious Speech of Students, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 911, 969–70, 674–77 (2020) (arguing that
a school law federal decision that failed to mention the Constitution, the Establishment Clause, or any case
law was an illegitimate, harmful decision and jurisprudential error (citing Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486, 1–2 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
public/FA-TX-0001-0005.pdf).
265
See Mary B. Trevor, From Ostriches to Sci-Fi: A Social Science Analysis of the Impact of Humor
in Judicial Opinions, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 291, 302 (2014) (discussing the importance of clear, credible
explanations in judicial opinions).

Published by eCommons, 2022

446

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:3

The continued use of reasoned applications of Lemon in these
decisions reinforces the legitimacy and authority of the lower federal courts,
despite criticism of this case.266 Providing reasoned legal judgment through
these applications works against the degradation of constitutional
interpretation that occurs when courts—instead—take a convoluted
approach or an avoidance approach that gives rise to a public perception of
results-oriented jurisprudence.267 Examples of these latter decision-making
approaches are chaotic and not reflective of a “government of laws . . . [and]
a government of rules.”268 Conversely, relying upon a controlling precedent
like Lemon, which has never been expressly overruled (despite opportunities
to do so) and aligns with the foundational precedent of the Supreme Court’s
relevant jurisprudence, can hardly be deemed undisciplined.
As such, there is continued utility in the application of Lemon by
courts in evaluating religious activities in public schools and public aid to
religiously affiliated schools or their attendees. Such precedential reliance is
what makes “reasoned judgment—and what makes it reasoned rather than
judicial fiat.”269 Giving reasons for a judicial holding by applying the Lemon
framework fulfills the “necessary condition of rationality” that should be at
the heart of any judicial determination.270
In conclusion of this point and to be clear, this Article is not
advocating the use of the Lemon test as the exclusive means to analyze all
Establishment Clause cases or even all school law Establishment Clause
cases. Such a “Grand Unified Theory” simply does not exist here.271 As the
Court made clear in Walz, “The course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line . . . .”272 Calling for a singular
bright-line rule for this decision-making would not be an appropriate
reflection of the “pluralistic American society in which these cases arise.”273
Having the space for a variety of methods of Establishment Clause
interpretation of education law cases, in order to allow some necessary “play
266
See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2008) (arguing that
judicial authority results from the provision of “reasons for . . . rules, commands, orders, or instructions”).
267
See generally Andrew Cohen, Judge-Bashing Comes to the 2012 GOP Race, ATLANTIC (Dec. 27,
2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/judge-bashing-comes-to-the-2012-gop-race/
250385/ (criticizing a Fifth Circuit Establishment Clause “blithely dispatched” decision that provided no
express application of any Establishment Clause precedent as the product of the circuit court’s desire to
reach a certain result and as “a convenient cop-out by a federal court unwilling to address the merits of the
Supreme Court’s school prayer precedent”).
268
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Just Not Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law Constitutionalism,
54 VILL. L. REV. 181, 205–06 (2009).
270
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995).
271
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
although “[i]t is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all
the cases that may arise under a particular Clause . . . the same constitutional principle may operate very
differently in different contexts.”).
272
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
273
Cooley, supra note 264, at 990.
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in the joints,” as long as they align with Madisonian neutrality and the Court’s
jurisprudential precedent, is a net positive and is recognizant of the “different
and conflicting world-views [that] can [and do] co-exist within” our nation.274
And there is still a binding, yet-to-be overruled precedent to support the
continued use by the lower federal courts of the Lemon test as one method of
interpretation in complex education law Establishment Clause cases.275
B. The Supreme Court Will Likely Continue to Preserve the Lemon
Test for Education Law Cases to Avert the Destabilization of this
Area of Jurisprudence
The complete scrapping of Lemon would strike at the already shaky
foundations of the Court’s education law Establishment Clause doctrine.
By overruling Lemon in its entirety, the Court would expose a multitude of its
education law cases to corollary significant weakening. These cases include
not only those foundational cases upon which Lemon was based—Everson,
McCollum, Allen, and Schempp—but also those cases that applied the Lemon
test to reach their holdings. This potential domino effect could have
deleterious implications on the stability of the Court’s longstanding
precedents in this area—leaving the lower federal courts with no guidance as
to how they should decide these cases—and could undercut the legitimacy of
the Court as an institution. Because of these potential harms, it seems likely
that the calls for Lemon’s complete demise, if realized, would ultimately
be much more trouble than they are worth.
To completely overrule Lemon and its infamous test would be to
unravel a thread in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that connects back
to the Court’s seminal case of Everson. This concern runs in both directions,
as the elimination of Lemon could also lead to the perception that education
law cases that relied upon Lemon are no longer good law. Thus, it seems
unlikely that the Court will expressly overrule Lemon in its entirety. To do
so would be a major change to the Court’s longstanding education law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and it would destabilize an area of
jurisprudence that is already perceived to be built upon shifting sands.276 This
would be a perilous gambit that could lead to the erosion of a fundamental
component of “our constitutional scheme” and ultimately of the power of the
Court itself.277

274
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope
of Balancing in Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2006).
275
See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392–93 (1983) (noting “that the Establishment Clause presents
especially difficult questions of interpretation and application” in the area of education law).
276
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 72 (2017)
(arguing that “diversity and multiplicity in Establishment Clause doctrine are endemic and ineradicable”).
277
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (cautioning the Court
to be cognizant of “both the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded”).
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In addition to these concerns regarding the instability of the corpus of
Supreme Court case law that analyzes the Establishment Clause in the school
law context, removing Lemon from the constitutional decision-making
toolbox would lead to increased inconsistency among lower federal courts in
terms of how they handle these cases. This could create judicial distortions
that would instill the types of “divisive forces” into American public schools
that Justice Felix Frankfurter argued vitally needed to be kept at bay by
courts when analyzing education law Establishment Clause cases.278
These distortions are of especial significance in this area of First Amendment
law because “the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.”279
Having access to Lemon as a constitutional test, among others, allows
for the judiciary to engage in the “delicate” interpretation the Establishment
Clause requires.280 The case provides a mechanism for decision-making
based on a reason, which is certainly a better outcome than making decisions
in this area based on judicial fiat alone. Justice Scalia even admitted this peril,
arguing that “[t]o replace Lemon with nothing is simply to announce that we
are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our
haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any
principle.”281
Therefore, it seems likely that Lemon will continue to persist—
at least in the area of education law—to avoid the deterioration of this critical
area of First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Kagan’s approach in her
concurrence in American Legion, along with the tacit acknowledgment of
some legitimacy of Lemon in some cases by the plurality in that case, tilt
towards the continued existence of Lemon as available binding precedent in
this area of constitutional decision-making.282 Chief Justice Roberts has also
made clear that he has an abiding concern with maintaining the legitimacy
and perception of legitimacy of the Court when determining whether it should
expressly overrule a past precedent.283 This led to a hesitance by the
Roberts Court, in its earlier terms, to overrule the Court’s past precedents at
the same rate as preceding Courts, which might continue to be the trend if the
current Justices ascribe to the same view.284 Further, by continuing to allow
Lemon’s existence, it provides a potentially useful strawman for future
278

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960)).
280
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
281
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 751 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kagan, J., concurring).
283
See Thomas J. Molony, Taking Another Look at the Call on the Field: Roe, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Stare Decisis, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 733, 807 n.535 (2020) (discussing this concern of
Chief Justice Roberts).
284
See William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 316 (2020)
(“[T]he Roberts Court overrules precedent less often than the Rehnquist, Burger, or Warren Courts.”).
279
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majority and dissenting opinions.285 Finally, the express overruling of Lemon
would lead to a sizeable gap in the availability of puns and clever turns of
phrase for judicial opinions, law review articles, and symposia that rely on the
case’s survival.286
Still, there are some indicators that the Court might actually take this
determinative step. The increasing reliance of the Court on the primacy of
history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the rejection of alleged
First Amendment violations could result in the invalidation of Lemon.287
Additionally, of late, the conservative Justices on the Roberts Court have not
shied away from overruling past precedent, “especially when they are seen as
unsupported by originalist principles,” which could signal that they might be
willing to do the same with Lemon.288 The post-American Legion transition
in ideology on religious liberty and First Amendment jurisprudence with its
subsequent impact on voting bloc majorities that occurred with the
confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett could indeed be the catalyst for
the ultimate end of Lemon.289
However, the balance at this time appears to tip towards the continued
preservation of Lemon as an available analytical tool for courts in their
determination of Establishment Clause cases involving religious activities in
public schools and provision of public aid to religiously affiliated schools or
their attendees. This acknowledges the case’s alignment with the Court’s
foundational precedent in education law Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The maintenance of Lemon by the Supreme Court also averts the harms that
occur when judicial decision-making strays from the greater values of
285
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill . . . .
Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows
when one might need him.”); id. at 400 n.* (acknowledging that, despite his criticism of Lemon, he joined
the majority opinion in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), which utilized the Lemon test).
286
What a horror it would be to not pithily expound upon the ghoul that refuses to die if the Court
does expressly drive a final nail in Lemon’s coffin! Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(likening the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried”); see also, e.g., Josh Blackman, This Lemon
Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 351, 351 (2010) (“Lemon is a curious fruit. Unlike the proverbial wolf who comes not in
wolf’s clothing, but in sheep’s clothing, this lemon comes as a lemon.”) (citation omitted).
287
A majority of the justices in “American Legion [made] reasonably clear . . . that history and tradition
play a crucial role in Establishment Clause analysis.” Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319,
1327 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plurality
opinion)). However, the primacy of history analytical approach does not jibe with a proper constitutional
analysis of school law cases given the lack of public schools at the time of the Founding. See Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (“[A] historical approach is not useful in determining the proper
roles of church and state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time
the Constitution was adopted.”).
288
Dan T. Coenen, Reconceptualizing Hybrid Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2355, 2413 n.275 (2020).
289
See, e.g., Joshua J. Prince, Supreme Court’s Zeal to Secure Religious Rights, NEV. LAW.
(Jan. 2021), at 8 (discussing the significant ideological differences between Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Barrett and predicting that the Court’s religious liberty cases will continue to trend in the direction
of upholding religious rights claims with Justice Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg on the Court).

Published by eCommons, 2022

450

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:3

consistency and transparency.290 These harms can include the perceived
subversion of principled reasoning by federal courts, irreversible
destabilization of an area of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and an ultimate
sacrifice of judicial authority and legitimacy of the highest court in the land.291
Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will expressly
overrule Lemon in its entirety (at least for now).
VI. CONCLUSION
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is complex.292 As the Court
candidly acknowledged in Lemon, “The language of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment is at best opaque . . . .”293 Because of the divergent
analyses that the Court has applied in its interpretation of this clause in myriad
settings, this constitutional doctrine has been subject to intense criticism by
jurists and scholars alike.294 Given this antagonism, it should be little surprise
that individual analytical approaches within that hotbed corpus, like the
Lemon test, would also gain their fair share of notoriety and critique.295
290
See A. Christopher Bryant & Kimberly Breedon, How the Prohibition on “Under-Ruling” Distorts
the Judicial Function (and What to Do About It), 45 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 522 (2018) (discussing
the problems that result from the dissolution of the “requirements of consistency and transparency” in
judicial decision-making).
291
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“fidelity to precedent” is the source for public “conception of ‘the judiciary as a source of impersonal and
reasoned judgments’” (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)));
Evelyn Keyes, Judicial Strategy and Legal Reason, 44 IND. L. REV. 357, 381–82 (2011) (“[T]he integrity
and functionality of the [judicial] system depends upon the shared expectation that lawmakers and judges
will play by the rules of the game, i.e., that they will follow the rules and precedents produced by the
system itself.”); Donald J. Kochan, The “Reason-Giving” Lawyer: An Ethical, Practical, and Pedagogical
Perspective, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 267–68 (2013) (“[R]eason-giving demands a check of power
and helps the governed determine whether those in power are acting within their constraints . . . .
[T]his helps to engender a more democratic relationship with the giver and receiver. Reasons add
legitimacy and deviations from given reasons tend to call action into question.” (footnotes omitted)).
292
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79 (1984) (emphasizing the complexity of
Establishment Clause interpretation).
293
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
294
See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public Schools to Limit
Student-Proposed Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REV. 411, 418 (1995) (discussing the variety
of Establishment Clause controversies the Court has examined “in myriad educational settings”);
Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The case law that
the Supreme Court has heaped on the defenseless text of the establishment clause is widely acknowledged,
even by some Supreme Court Justices, to be formless, unanchored, subjective and provide no guidance.”);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY 227 (2008) (describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as almost incomprehensible);
Fallon, supra note 276, at 60 (labeling this doctrine “notoriously confused and disarrayed”); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and
Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 670–71, 676 (2013) (concluding that this area of constitutional law
is “under perpetual clouds of instability, illegitimacy, and controversy”).
295
See Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2007)
(“Commentators and jurists on all sides of the debate about the proper scope of the Establishment Clause
have long agreed that Establishment Clause doctrine is a chaotic and contradictory mess.”);
David M. Smolin, The Religious Root and Branch of Anti-Abortion Lawlessness, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 119,
142 (1995) (“The specific holdings of the Court interpreting the Establishment Clause have been so
inconsistent that most commentators long ago stopped trying to reconcile the cases.”); see also, e.g.,
Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“The still
stalking Lemon test and the other tests and factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from
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However, Lemon has never been expressly and entirely overruled by
a majority of the Supreme Court. Therefore, pursuant to the axiomatic
hierarchical precedent doctrine, its use remains a valid interpretive approach
to construing the Establishment Clause for lower federal courts in many
cases.296 The only subset of Establishment Clause cases to which Lemon
should no longer be applied based on a majority consensus of the Court in
American Legion includes cases involving religious text or imagery on public
monuments, symbols, displays, or ceremonies.
As to the remainder of the categories of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and certainly to those education law cases involving religious
exercises in public schools, Lemon is still binding precedent for lower federal
courts.297 And there is arguable utility in its continued use, given that it
provides a guideline in a murky area of jurisprudence that allows for reasoned
judgments that reinforce judicial authority. While the Lemon test might not
be the best test and certainly is not the only test, its usage is an improvement
over Establishment Clause education law decisions that have ignored the
existing relevant precedent by issuing unprincipled, summary opinions of
judicial fiat. Its use provides analysis that goes beyond the “mere platitudes”
the Court warned against in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.298
In sum, the application of the Lemon test by federal courts in this area supports
judicial formalism—a likely reason for its continued persistence in lower
federal courts’ decision-making until and unless the Supreme Court overrules
the case in its entirety.
Why has the Supreme Court not taken this step? It is likely because
Lemon is the progeny of seminal Establishment Clause cases involving
religious activities in public schools and the provision of public aid
to religiously affiliated schools and their attendees. Maintaining the stability
of this jurisprudence is vital for the important institutions of K-12 education
within the constellation of the American republic, and it recognizes the special
circumstances of the public school in Establishment Clause doctrine.299

time to time in order to answer specific questions, are so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has not become more fathomable.”) (citation omitted).
296
See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 820 (1994) (“[T]he doctrine of hierarchical precedent . . . constitutes a virtually undiscussed
axiom of adjudication . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995)
(“We would have thought it self-evident that the lower courts must adhere to our precedents.”).
297
See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in
the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 570 (1991)
(arguing proper jurisprudential approaches are premised on “principled, constitutional theories,” even
if they are different approaches).
298
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
299
See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (“The public school is at
once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny.”);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992) (highlighting the differences of Establishment Clause cases
that arise in “the public school context” versus other environments).
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Conversely, the complete overruling of Lemon could destabilize the
Court’s foundational education law Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
could implicitly call into question the validity of the precedent upon which
Lemon was based. It could also impart a message to lower federal courts that
there is no longer any test upon which they can evaluate these types of claims.
And that is something that truly could cause doctrinal chaos.300 Consequently,
because of this cascade of potential harms, it seems likely that the
Supreme Court will continue to retain the Lemon test for Establishment
Clause analysis of certain education law claims.
Because of the expansive and varying categories of Establishment
Clause cases, this jurisprudence can never be one-size-fits-all.301 There is
no “litmus-paper test” here.302 The Court has rightfully acknowledged this.303
Cautious and careful judicial scrutiny is necessary for this area. For fifty
years, the Lemon test has been a tool—among others—used by lower federal
courts and by the Supreme Court in their attempts to achieve this type of
reasoned and reasonable inquiry. Thus, Lemon will likely continue to be
an available constitutional mechanism for this incredibly important subset of
Establishment Clause cases. And if not, this persistence of Lemon might
ultimately morph into a lament for it.

300
See McConnell, supra note 142, at 118–20 (discussing the “doctrinal confusion” Lemon
has created).
301
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every government
practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement
or disapproval of religion.”).
302
Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
303
See id.
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